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Executive summary
This review explores how a culture of design for safety can enhance the safety of the world 
around us. Design for safety goes beyond legislation, regulations and standards. These all 
play an important role for established products and services but their limited scope often 
leads to missed opportunities to enhance safety by taking a broader perspective.
Design is applied to both mature industries (which have many years of experience and  
a good understanding of risks and how to reduce them) and emerging industries (that  
use new technologies requiring new ways of controlling risk which may not yet be known  
or understood). An example of an emerging risk is the internet that is enabling rapid 
innovation of new products which generate data. This data is widely shared across the 
internet and the risks associated with this are as yet not fully understood by the public.
A design for safety culture takes a holistic approach to understanding the influences that 
affect safety. Such influences are varied and take into account the broader environment 
within which design operates, including complex interactions, behaviour and culture.  
It goes beyond traditional design methods and focuses on the goal of a safer design.
Implementing design for safety requires an understanding of the challenges and the methods 
to address them. It needs multidisciplinary teams that bring together people with the 
relevant skills to understand the challenges and a collaborative approach of ‘designing with’ 
rather than the more traditional approach of ‘designing for’. This can be achieved through an 
international diverse community that works together to identify and share best practices.
Key gaps that impede the realisation of a design for safety culture
During the preparation of this report a number of gaps were identified that impede 
the realisation of a design for safety culture. Addressing these gaps will create a design 
for safety culture that will provide significant societal benefit. The key gaps identified:
•  We need to embed a better understanding of human behaviour, culture and 
emotional states into the design of products, services and systems. 
•  We need a clear set of principles and ethics to create a design for safety culture.
•  We need an agreed overview of design for safety methods and practices that can be 
applied to current and future design for safety challenges.
•  We need to share best design for safety practices in industrial, institutional and 
educational sectors through global networks.
•  We need a design for safety practice built on education and training.
•  We need to learn how to deliver new products and services that are intrinsically safer 
through design. 
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Applying a design for safety approach will not only improve existing designs but  
importantly develop appropriate solutions to prevent or minimise future incidents and 
accidents from occurring.
To start debate in the design community about growing a design for safety culture, the 
review proposes a preliminary definition of design for safety and a set of aspirational 
principles that support building a design for safety culture. 
Finally, the review makes a set of recommendations to bridge the design for safety gap.  
The recommendations are: 
Identify future design for safety challenges 
There is a need to establish a design for safety research observatory capability that identifies 
emerging major safety issues and investigates whether new design for safety methods are 
required.
 
Develop future design for safety methods and skills
Looking forwards there is a need to establish a capability that has expertise in design  
for safety methods including research and experimental design activity, graduate and 
postgraduate educational programmes and engagement with the wider international 
community to learn and share experiences and best practice.
 
Establish a network of global excellence
To maximise the impact of these two recommendations an international network of centres 
of excellence should be established.  
The unique input of the Foundation
There is already international interest in turning the above recommendations into  
reality. Before the centres of excellence can be established there is a need for preliminary 
activity that would provide the momentum for others to grow and maintain the first two 
recommendations. The Foundation is uniquely placed to support the initial stages that lead 
to the establishment of what will be a programme that benefits society at large.
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Design shapes our daily lives and the world around us, yet we  
are often unaware of its presence. There are more mobile phone 
devices in the world than there are people and every aspect of  
the phone, from the way it looks to how easy it is to use, are all 
designed. But design goes beyond the user experience to what is 
inside the phone and the services it provides, and beyond, to the 
global infrastructure network to which the phone is connected. 
Perhaps the fact that we do not think about all these facets of  
the design should be thought of as a measure of its success? 
However, the process of designing involves elements of risk which 
raise questions like: will it work; will people want it; is it safe?  
Of all these risks, the one that concerns us directly as users is 
safety from harm; be this physical harm, psychological harm or 
any other type of harm.
This review takes a broad look at the role of design through  
the lens of the Foundation’s charitable objectives. It identifies 
how design should be a holistic process that brings together 
multidisciplinary teams and users to create safer designs that 
consider all the risks, not only those which are the traditional 
focus. It importantly identifies that new technology brings  
with it new risks, some of which are yet to be identified or 
understood. In order to create a design for safety culture  
the review concludes with recommendations to build an 
international capability that can provide the design community 
with the principles, methods and tools it needs to prepare for  
the safety challenges of tomorrow.
Foreword
This review takes a 
broad look at the  
role of design through 
the lens of the 
Foundation’s charitable 
objectives. 
Professor Richard Clegg 
Foundation Chief Executive 
Lloyd’s Register Foundation
Professor Rachel Cooper 
Distinguished Professor of Design 
Management and Policy 
Lancaster University
Chris Ross
Chief Engineer  
Commercial Maritime Consultancy 
QinetiQ
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Background
This report is the eighth in a series commissioned by the Lloyd’s Register Foundation. It 
examines how design plays an essential role in creating safe conditions for us in which to live 
and work – therefore creating a safer world in line with the Foundation’s charitable mission.
The Lloyd’s Register Foundation is a charity and owner of the 258-year old Lloyd’s Register 
Group Limited (LR). LR is a leading global provider of engineering and technology-centric 
professional services to clients in a range of sectors, primarily in energy and maritime, but 
also in food, healthcare and manufacturing. 
The Foundation is a charity with a global perspective. Reflecting this the principal 
investigator, Prof Paul Anderson, Dean of the RCA School of Design, co-chairs Prof Rachel 
Cooper and Chris Ross, and co-investigators Prof Ashley Hall and Dr Laura Ferrarello 
identified an international expert panel comprising of industry, academia, government, 
regulators and representative bodies. The panel assembled in London in February 2018 for a 
two-day symposium to consider the subject of design for safety from cross-sector perspectives 
with a second more focused event in March 2018. 
The Royal College of Art (RCA) provides postgraduate education at MA, MRes and PhD  
level. Its intensive teaching and research environment brings unique and transformative 
experiences of design for many real-world, life- and safety-critical situations. Central to  
the success of the college is a multidisciplinary, inclusive and human-centred approach.  
As a global university it researches and collaborates with extensive networks in academia, 
industry and government. The RCA School of Design plays a pivotal role in such networks, 
which aims at increasing the collaboration of the RCA with STEM (science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics) subjects to find solutions to some of the most pressing issues 
of today and of the future.
The review process started with a literature review and international design for safety 
questionnaire that informed design thinking methods used in the two symposia.  
These included mapping and visualising issues that emerged from case studies presented  
by the international multidisciplinary group of expert participants in the first symposium 
(figure 1). Insights gained from the first meeting provided direction for a second symposium 
that focused on the role of design in future safety challenges. This report contains the 
insights and findings from the panel and expert participants.
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Throughout the foresight review process the investigators tested an initial design for safety 
definition as given below below:
  “We believe design for safety enables people and technology to operate safely.  
Design for safety is the actions taken to ensure that an item, system, system of systems or 
network is free from adverse impacts on individuals, organisations, communities and the 
environment, whether these happen as a result of implicit or explicit risks”
Building on the findings of this review, the Foundation will look to identify aspects of design 
for safety that might provide opportunities or threats to safety, in line with its charitable 
objectives, and where the Foundation might focus its research and other grant giving to 
make a distinctive positive impact.
Figure 1: Example of case study from symposium 1, mapping design issues from participants 
arising across sectors from symposium
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Design has the ability to significantly improve safety, reduce risk and save lives. However,  
we continue to see many examples of safety failures and increasing risks that design could 
address more effectively.
To frame the concept of design for safety think of the Nils Bohlin-designed seatbelt for  
Volvo of 1959. Realising that death and injury rates for drivers and passengers were at an 
unacceptable level the seatbelt was developed as an easy to use intuitive piece of design 
innovation. Not only was this made a free piece of intellectual property for the automotive 
industry, saving thousands of lives, it also changed behaviour by reminding us that every 
time we get in a car and use the seatbelt we are engaging in a risky activity. Design for safety 
is not only about reducing risk it can also change behaviour and prevent risk. In this review  
it is not only the shape, function and appearance of objects that are being discussed but also 
how through design we can influence the behaviours of people.
The activity of design sits between people and technology, and therefore design can 
enhance the way in which people safely use products, systems and services. However there is 
a large body of case studies and research which show that there is also significant room for 
improvement. We continue to see product recalls of mature devices (which have existed for 
decades) including hairdryers, cars and washing machines, sometimes running into millions 
of faulty units. The design and manufacture of some of these products, when used as sold, 
have the potential to cause harm and significant risk to life as seen in the examples of the 
hairdryer and tumble dryer shown in figure 2. 
Such risks are not restricted to consumer products. There are many other examples including 
building safety procedures whose design can introduce a major risk to life as tragically 
demonstrated in the Grenfell Tower block failure in London, an example of multiple complex 
design failures.
       
Can design be used as a strategic tool to develop safer, more reliable, resilient and 
sustainable systems and networks? A better understanding of design for safety would  
allow us to make sure that safety and risk reduction are considered at the earliest stages of 
developing new products, systems and technologies instead of reacting to failures that have 
taken place. In these ways design has the potential to reduce safety risks in our daily lives.
Introduction
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Figure 2: Tumble dryer fire risk recall and faulty hairdryer posted on Facebook.
The 2017 Grenfell Tower fire, London, an example of multiple complex design failures
By Natalie Oxford [CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0)], via Wikimedia 
Commons
Lloyd’s Register Foundation11 
So far the review has broadly illustrated the risks that design for safety can tackle through 
interventions that could be delivered either by products or by strategies regulating how 
people behave in certain situations, for example when interacting with technologies. Now 
we turn to the process of design to understand where the opportunities for improvement 
can be found. 
To frame the issues and describe the findings the investigators selected case studies which 
cover three different contexts; equipment design failure, design issues in data-driven 
infrastructure and community resilience to natural disasters. The lessons apply across both 
mature and emerging industries where design for safety can have many types of intervention 
from behavioural, environmental or strategic design approaches. Each case study responds to 
the sentence 'Who would have thought...' which helps illustrate the design risks.
During the process of developing this review a simple phrase was often repeated - Who 
would have thought….? This is the type of phrase that often concludes an accident or 
incident report and paints a clear picture of the type of unexpected outcome of what may 
be a trivial incident leading to a major safety issue. For example, who would have thought 
that a barrier added to one section of the River Thames wall to stop people falling into the 
river could be used as a backrest to sit on the wall (figure 3) and actually increase the risk of 
falling into the water? 
What type of issues are we considering?
Generally speaking there are two types of design issue that we need to consider that 
regularly occur when understanding design for safety. First, failures can occur when we  
fail to apply lessons from understanding human behaviour and human interactions with 
technology. This is particularly evident when unforeseen events, complexities, human 
behaviours and reactions are combined leading to confused thinking and poor decision 
making. When people are overly focused on technologies at the expense of understanding 
human behaviour then this can produce the conditions that easily lead to increased risks.  
Second, at the other end of the spectrum, design can significantly remove risk (through 
human-centred thinking and human systems integration) and improve safety by using 
innovative technologies, clearly communicating risk, applying lessons and solutions from 
other areas, and by innovating new safer machines or systems. Foresight processes, blue sky 
thinking, horizon scanning and a whole range of design methods can be applied to explore 
safety issues and improve design through analysis, simulation and testing. These design 
methods and practices (including new ones yet to be developed) can be applied to a wide 
range of scales from a single product through to an entire system or infrastructure.
What is design for safety?
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Figure 3: Design for safety risk: River barrier can unexpectedly be used as a backrest for 
sitting on top of the river wall increasing the risk of falls May 2018
Case study 1: Who would have thought… an unforeseen situation contributed 
to equipment failure in the Clipper Round the World Yacht Race
To articulate the close relationship between people and technology and how it might 
lead to unforeseen events this case study illustrates two accidents both leading to the 
loss of lives.  
In 2016 the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) reported an accident leading 
to the death of a British crew member who died after being washed overboard 
(overboarding) during a leg of the round the world Clipper Race1. 
The investigation identified the circumstances of a crew member being swept into the 
ocean caused by the failure of tethering the crew member to the boat. A culture of  
a lack of supervision over safety and behaviour that lowered the perception of risk 
played an important role in the crew member’s death and reinforced the importance 
of safety equipment. 
1    MAIB (2017). Report on the investigations of two fatal accidents on board the UK 
registered yacht CV21 122nm west of Porto, Portugal on 4 September 2015 and 
mid-Pacific Ocean on 1 April 2016, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/ 
58ee0b5040f0b606e7000166/MAIBInvReport07_2017.pdf [Accessed 25 March 2018]
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In 2017 another accident in the same  
race series outlined a safety flaw  
resulting from the new equipment 
recommendations implemented after the 
first incident. The new recommendation 
was that crew members should wear a 
harness tethered to a piece of webbing 
that runs the length of the ship to 
prevent overboarding in rough seas. 
At the time of the accident the crew 
member was correctly tethered when 
they were struck by a large wave. 
However, the tether hook impacted a 
post on the vessel and deformed due  
to the impact loading the hook in a 
direction for which it was not designed, ie 
laterally. The deformation caused the clip 
to be released which led to overboarding 
and the death of the crew member.
The 2017 accident that caused a loss of life outlines how safety equipment design 
needs to understand the full conditions in which the crew members operate and work. 
Even though the hook passed longitudinal stress tests, it was not designed to cope 
with significant load in any other direction. 
Both accidents describe how design for safety needs to tackle a variety of different 
human and technical factors in a complex changing environment. This case study 
outlines how different changing elements play a role in designing for safety and how 
these in turn influence people’s behaviour in regards to equipment and procedures. 
Current certifications and regulations cannot account for all situations. 
Who would have thought that known and tested safety procedures and equipment 
would have failed to save a life? From supervisory procedures through to an 
unexpected design failure because of unforeseen loads, this case study highlights the 
complexity of both organisational behaviours and the maritime environment within 
which design for safety needs to operate.
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There are differences in how mature and emerging industries understand risk and the 
degree of knowledge they have developed in the practice of design for safety. Mature 
industries generally have an understanding of risk which is clearly structured and regulated, 
while emerging areas are developing and discovering safety issues and how they should be 
understood and solved. Clearly there are lessons that mature and emerging areas can learn 
from one other which can lead to a cross-sector approach to design for safety. The diagram 
in figure 4 illustrates an example of the lessons that can be learnt by mature and emerging 
industries from the consumer products sector using a comparison between a traditional and 
‘smart’ internet connected kettle. A user will know the risks of using a traditional (mature 
sector) kettle but will be unfamiliar that an internet connected (emerging sector) kettle can 
bring additional risks, but of a very different and intangible type.
Mature 
consumer 
product 
Intangible risk
Tangible risk
Emerging 
consumer 
product
Server sends data
to unknown location 
Customised 
use
Information 
distributed 
to network
Traditional kettle
Internet of 
things kettle
Body injury
Wrong use of 
products
Steam/water 
burns
Figure 4: Comparing tangible and intangible risks between mature and emerging consumer 
product sector
To maximise the potential for learning it is necessary to visualise the core relationships in a 
way that puts design at the centre of discussions with experts across sectors and disciplines. 
To achieve this the matrix in figure 5 (overleaf) has been designed to show how lessons can 
be learnt between mature and emerging industrial areas. Such areas could be in different 
businesses, for example a start-up or global enterprise, however, both mature and emerging 
situations could also exist within established businesses and institutions at the same time.
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Figure 5: Double axis design for safety matrix putting design at the heart of human-
technology and mature-emerging sectors
The thinking behind the diagram has been strongly influenced by postgraduate research 
projects undertaken at The Royal College of Art aligned with Lloyd’s Register Foundation’s 
Safety Grand Challenges. In February 2017 two challenges were set focusing on the safe 
transfer of people between ships at sea2 and future strategic design solutions aimed at 
making the River Thames the safest river by the year 2030 with the Royal National Lifeboat 
Institution (RNLI). Design for safety was understood not only as technology and human 
operations but expanded to include behaviour change, systemic complexity, safety 
communication and user journeys3.  
DESIGN tackling challenges between 
behaviour people and technology
DESIGN for safety 
learning lessons 
between mature and 
emerging sectors
Mature industries
Technology
Emerging industries
Human
Technology
Human
2    Hall, A; Ferrarello, L; Kann, M, (2017). Safety Grand Challenge: Safe Ship Boarding 
and Thames Safest River 2030, Report for the Lloyd’s Register Foundation, pp 128. 
ISBN: 978-0-9561364-3-5
3    Ferrarello, L; Hall, A; Kann, M; Hee Lee, C, (2017). Collaborating Design Risk, IASDR 
Conference, November 2017, Cincinnati, USA
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Case study 2: Who would have thought…improving life in the home could 
create The House That Spied on Me
Digital technologies can now be found in domestic supplies and appliances and a  
new critical infrastructure has emerged that connects products with each other via wifi 
and other networks. It may come as a surprise to some that this infrastructure impacts 
the integrity of people’s lives in relation to privacy and human rights. These devices  
in people’s homes create data which is information. This information travels via the 
internet beyond the walls of the home and gets distributed to unknown locations  
for unknown reasons by unknown people. There is very little transparency in how this 
process works nor the logic or intention that is behind these exchanges or what the 
implications might be. To live in a ‘connected home’ means living in the ‘house that 
spies on me’. The House that Spied on Me4 project details all the invisible data risks 
that a connected home could be exposed to.
4    Hill, K & Mattu, S. (2018). House that spied on me, in Gizmodo, https://gizmodo.
com/the-house-that-spied-on-me-1822429852 [Accessed 25 March 2018]
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What scale of design activity are we considering?
Apart from tackling the risks we understand, the ‘known knowns’, the two most significant 
areas for future design for safety are the risks we do not yet understand, the ‘known 
unknowns’, such as those that arise from the increasing complexity of technological 
connections and the risks posed by climate change, and the ‘unknown unknowns’ that are 
yet to be identified in emerging industries. Technological risks are emerging and range from 
the physical risk of drones, robots and autonomous cars to the invisible and intangible risks 
of artificial intelligence, sensing, surveillance, data security and personal information. While 
The invisible infrastructure that connects our supplies and appliances helps decision 
making but also puts people under the potential threat of exposing their private lives 
through data leakage. Data leakage can increase a number of safety risks including the 
targeting and severity of cyberattacks and ransomware attacks as more personalised 
information becomes available. It also gives external access to important infrastructure 
like heating systems, lighting and communications which can imply other information 
such as an empty home. 
Smart products are supplied as black boxes to the consumer and there is little 
understanding or visualisation of the implications of unsupervised information  
flow. These products might warn of the physical danger (like electrocution) but say 
little or nothing about the risk personal data release entails. Designing intangible 
infrastructure that communicates and engages people to raise awareness of 
information flow is a strategy that design for safety needs to adopt.
There are very few designs (none apparently on the mass market) that aim at 
increasing public awareness of personal information released when interacting with 
connected digital supplies. There is indeed an urgent need for tackling cybersecurity 
and the related risks through a design for safety communication solution that takes 
into account how people act and behave. Design for safety could tackle this risk  
by increasing the sense of awareness and visualising or representing the risks these 
interactions expose householders to. 
Who would have thought a technology designed to automate and improve people’s 
lives would open up their whole private domestic space to access from unknown 
people in unknown places, with unknown intentions?
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a complete picture of all the future risks in these areas are yet to be identified (if this is even 
possible which seems unlikely) there are clear benefits that design can bring to exploring 
complex areas with vague or seemingly impossible to solve ‘wicked’ problems. 
Future global safety challenges require new types of design methods and approaches 
needing new combinations of human-centred design thinking delivered through new 
technologies. For example, communication methods and the ability to instantly broadcast  
to a global audience has now gone beyond traditional media outlets and exists in social 
networks and online retail, all of which are changing and building new belief systems and 
new ways of doing business. By way of example some online retailers provide customers' 
reviews and ratings for products that they sell; relying on these reviews when making a 
purchase is an example of a new belief system where you are placing your trust in online 
reviews. Design for safety is operating in new complex areas including the virtual world.
Communication can create direct physical or psychological stress affecting the behaviours and 
beliefs of a large number of people who can vastly overestimate the disproportionate risks of 
the likelihood of disruptive events. It is known that migration, food supplies, water scarcity, 
terrorism, geopolitical events and climate change can produce disproportionate impacts on 
human populations5,6. These are all issues that can be addressed through safer design. 
5    Burdett, R (2017). Infrastructures of equality versus inequality. in Ruby, I and Ruby, A, (eds.) 
Infrastructure Space, Berlin: Ruby Press, pp. 306-313, ISBN 978394407184
6    World Economic Forum (2018). The Global Risk Report 2016, World Economic Forum 13th Ed.
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Case study 3: Who would have thought…design for safer environmental 
systems
Hurricane Sandy Rebuild by Design 
In 2012, Hurricane Sandy revealed the fragility of New York City’s critical infrastructures 
to cope with major climate events. In the hurricane’s aftermath people lost lives, homes 
and possessions, power grids failed and transportation systems collapsed. 
To protect people’s safety against future events President Obama’s administration 
explored a strategy that would not only operate through physical intervention, but instil 
a culture of safety based on the collaboration and participation of more inclusive parties. 
Learning from recent lessons that this collaboration could not be directed only by 
expert policy makers, engineers or architects, the strategy involved inviting the whole 
stakeholder community of people affected by the hurricane to tackle reconstruction. 
Led by Henk Ovink, the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force’s objective was the 
identification of strategic interventions developed from co-created ideas fostered by 
the participation of local governments, communities, designers and experts. 
The dialogue would promote a collaborative interdisciplinary approach to safety 
through creative thinking and design:
• It engaged the public in the decision-making process leading to new environmental
policies tackling climate related events.
• It aimed to ‘design trust’ across experts, communities and government thus
increasing the responsibility everyone plays in the system.
The outcome of this dialogue is the Rebuild by Design network7, which approaches 
environmental safety challenges through ecosystems made of people, infrastructure 
and policy collaborating through design principles. For the Hurricane Sandy project, 
Rebuild by Design launched an architectural competition where multidisciplinary 
teams came together to develop implementable solutions to the region’s most 
complex needs. Unlike other competitions, the process through which the design took 
shape engaged local communities, global experts, stakeholders and government who 
co-created the design proposals. 
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As a result of being engaged in the process and participating in the actual creative 
phase, local communities developed a resilience towards uncertainty and a sense of 
responsibility towards their location. The Rebuild by Design case study illustrates how 
design for safety strategies need to be dynamic, scalable and have accessible principles 
that people, experts, governments and institutions can share through a globally 
diverse network that fosters the exchange of knowledge provided by different user 
groups and environments. 
Who would have thought that government could learn to listen to the community 
and engage with them in improving resilience to future major climate events?
7    Ovink, H & Boeijenga, J, (2018). Too Big. Rebuild by Design. A Transformative 
Response to Climate Change. Rotterdam: NAi Uitgevers / Publishers Stichting, ISBN: 
978-94-6208-315-8
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What risk is there in design activity itself?
An important question that is infrequently discussed is what risk is there from design to 
itself. There is a natural assumption that design intrinsically delivers human benefits, yet 
when we look at design training and the work of designers in practice it is difficult to see 
widely agreed design for safety methods or principles. 
Courses at undergraduate or postgraduate level that focus on design for safety have not 
been identified. For several decades there has been a strong focus on user-centred design 
and while this has led to many safer design solutions, its central activity is geared towards 
satisfying the user instead of intrinsically having safer design. In other words, a safer by 
design culture needs to focus on more than user-centred design.
The research for this foresight review found very little evidence at either the national or 
international level to indicate that design for safety practice exists as an area for exchange 
of ideas and debate. A major risk to design for safety may well be the assumption that 
designers and industry already have developed methods and practices for future safety 
challenges, without critically checking if this is true. 
Who designs for safety and where is this activity happening?
It might seem a simple question, ‘who practices designs for safety?’, yet it has become clear 
that this is not an easy question to answer. 
A range of designers, including but not limited to industrial, service, communication and 
transport designers, understand the concept of designing safe things however very few 
people in any of these areas describe themselves primarily as ‘designers for safety’. 
In engineering, clear safety principles and working practices exist although many of these 
consist of analysing and applying regulations, codes, standards and safety factors for 
technical constructions. However, engineers also play a role in design.
Finally there are non-designers. These are people whose work contains elements of design 
however they would not normally call themselves designers and may not even recognise that 
what they are doing is called design. 
Closely linked to this is the interesting question around who owns design for safety? An easy 
assumption would be designers, yet responsibility for integrating complex technological 
products and services quickly falls to manufacturers and conformance of products to codes, 
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Key points 
• Risks are influenced by behaviours and culture.
• New technology creates new emerging risks.
• Unexpected situations lead to unexpected outcomes.
• Complexity can increase risk.
• Strategic design approaches can consider the bigger picture.
regulations and legislation. In a fast developing world manufacturers and regulators  
are often struggling to keep pace with new technological advancements. Under these 
circumstances the question of establishing clear responsibility for safe design across 
industries, sectors and disciplines becomes a challenge.
Making the world’s first 3D-printed steel bridge Image courtesy of MX3D
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An important perspective in understanding the concept of design 
for safety can be found from within industry. 
Six industrial sectors have been engaged during the review process 
representing a mix of direct user engagement (consumer products, 
food products, medical products, transportation technology, 
national infrastructure and manufacturing technology). Each of 
these areas includes design activity but in different forms. For 
example consumer and medical products cover more traditional 
product design areas whereas food and national infrastructure 
involve a strategic sector design, advanced design for behaviour 
change and design of services.
Sector perspectives
An important 
perspective in 
understanding the 
concept of design for 
safety can be found 
from within industry.
An online survey was circulated with a series of key questions, 
selected to form an initial understanding of views on design  
for safety, from a range of international experts with diverse 
backgrounds from government, industry, academia and non 
governmental organisations. The purpose of the survey was not to 
produce a large quantity of highly accurate statistical information 
but to gather insights from a targeted number of experts and use 
these to initiate discussion and debate in the first symposium. 
A total of 75 international cross-sector experts engaged with the 
process by completing an online survey with the key insights 
reported in this part of the review.
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Strongly
disagree
Strongly
agree
Disagree
Neither agree
or disagree
Agree Not relevant 
to my sector
Skipped
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7
Figure 6: Indicator of responses from the consumer product sector
The survey gained evidence from seven questions where participants were asked to respond 
to the statement:
Design for safety:
• is a major issue in your sector? (Q1)
• clearly communicates procedures to identify or prevent risk? (Q2)
• is clearly owned across all levels of management? (Q3)
• is recognised as the top operational criterion above costs? (Q4)
• continually assesses risk at all stages of business operation? (Q5)
• combines risk assessment across both technology and human behaviour? (Q6)
• is a system which includes feedback from the general public to improve safety? (Q7)
Respondents from the consumer products sector clearly agreed that design for safety risks is 
a major issue that is clearly owned, communicated and a top operational criterion (figure 6 
below). However, there are some major risks in this sector. For example, the recent Hotpoint 
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tumble dryer recall affecting up to 5,000,000 machines8 and a ‘flamethrower’-hairdryer sold 
by Amazon9, both mentioned on page 9. These are both examples of products in mature 
markets suffering extreme design malfunctions causing real risk; the former case, it is 
claimed, could have caused hundreds of domestic fires. While these may be significant cases 
that graphically illustrate risk, they can also be interpreted as a very small number of 
individual risks compared to the billions of products sold globally every year. 
The consumer product sector has a particularly strong consumer feedback loop via 
ombudsmen, regulation, online reviews (Which? Magazine, Amazon etc) and a discerning 
tradition that has driven high levels of safety overall. However, this does not insulate the 
sector from a mistaken belief that ‘we have got it right’ and it remains surprising that global 
manufacturers in mature sectors can have such major product failures. 
8     Pepin, S, (compiler) (2017), Whirlpool and the product safety system, Westminster Hall 
Debate, 26 April 2017, House of Common Library, Number CDP-2017-0123, 21 April 2017
9   Ritschel, C, (2018), Amazon removes hair dryer from website after video shows it shooting 
out flames, in Independent Online, 2 February 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/
life-style/amazon-hair-dryer-shop-sales-video-flame-on-fire-oracorp-erika-shoolbred-
facebook-a8191416.html [Accessed on 25 March 2018]
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Key points 
• Big differences in how sectors view design for safety.
• Gap between new technology introduction and safe behaviour.
• Need designs for safety developed in a sustainable lifecycle.
• Difficulties understanding complexity and scale of emerging risks.
• Missing principles and ethics for design for safety practice.
Sectors without a strong consumer feedback loop include national infrastructure, 
manufacturing technology and, to a lesser extent, transport infrastructure. Both transport 
and national infrastructure respondents broadly agreed that design for safety is a major issue 
that is not clearly recognised; and national infrastructure shows conflicting opinion around 
continuous risk assessment across all stages of business operation, and that risk assessment 
combines both technology and human behaviour. Manufacturing technology respondents 
however reported general agreement that design for safety risks are clearly communicated 
and owned. These responses are reported in table 1 on pages 27-30 (design for safety 
recognition by sector).
A second set of survey questions asked respondents to identify what they perceived to be  
the main design for safety issues in their sector and replies are reported in table 1. Concerns 
included cyber security, data overload, public uncertainty and complexity. A common factor 
across the sectors is human behaviour in relation to technology. Crossing all sectors there 
were terms like; behavioural concerns, understandable to foreigners, effect on human 
performance, uncertainty vs. risk, shaping behaviours, fake information and personal data. 
All sectors agree that there is a tension between how humans behave and perform and the 
technologies provided to do work. This tension results from ignoring human behavioural 
tendencies and applying a culture of procedures and conformance. Another way to  
describe this is that the issues are down to poor communication, physical design and more 
complex issues around the ability to cope with information (cognitive loading), cultural or 
social differences or mental models that do not align with the technologies supplied for 
certain tasks.
Lloyd’s Register Foundation27 
Table 1: Main design for safety sector responses
Sector Design for safety recognition by sector Main design for safety issues Definitions of design for safety
Consumer products Design for safety is a major issue across the sector and 
agreement that risks are clearly communicated, owned and 
are a top operational criterion. However we continue to 
see major global consumer product recalls.
• Privacy and cyber 
security
• Data visualisation on 
security and risk
• Physical motion and 
control
• Mechatronic 
components in public 
spaces
• Interactive exhibits
• Build quality
• Antennas
• Behavioural concerns
• Update of existing 
solutions
• Clear and 
understandable to 
foreigners
• Ergonomics - the way 
we use our devices, even 
wear our devices (MR, 
VR) for gaming or 
productivity
“Zero risk of life threatening effects.”
“Absolute minimisation of livelihood 
and ecosystem threatening effects.”
Transport technology Broad agreement across most questions, however a few 
representatives from Europe in industry disagree across the 
board, and more contradiction around ownership of risk. 
Design for safety is not clearly understood in this sector.
• What kind of analysis 
will lead me to complete 
realistic body of safety 
requirements? 
• Reduce the leading 
cause of preventable 
deaths (traffic accidents)
• Software risk mitigation 
from design solutions to 
operational procedures
• Electronic displays
• Universal or 
standardised systems
• Data overload
• Regulatory frameworks 
for mariners (ie bridge 
design)
• Heat, noise and 
vibration effect on 
human performance
• Multiple alarms
• Less human operators 
on ships means risks can 
be greater
• Complexity over 
simplicity of use of 
lifeboats means they 
might be killing more 
seamen than they are 
saving
• Is technology being 
designed without 
diligent research into its 
actual effect on 
humans?
“Consider the entire life-cycle of the 
system and all its aspects, ie social. , 
technical and interfaces, in order to 
design for safety.”
National infrastructure Broadly agree that design for safety is a major issue  
and clearly communicates a procedure that prevents or 
identifies risk. The sector shows conflict around 
continuous risk assessment across all stages of business 
operation, and that risk assessment combines both 
technology and human behaviour.
• Uncertainty vs risk
• Public policies
“Inclusive design of urban spaces that 
understands any user or machine
accessing streets and how they behave 
and how they interact.”
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Sector Design for safety recognition by sector Main design for safety issues Definitions of design for safety
Consumer products Design for safety is a major issue across the sector and 
agreement that risks are clearly communicated, owned and 
are a top operational criterion. However we continue to 
see major global consumer product recalls.
• Privacy and cyber 
security
• Data visualisation on 
security and risk
• Physical motion and 
control
• Mechatronic 
components in public 
spaces
• Interactive exhibits
• Build quality
• Antennas
• Behavioural concerns
• Update of existing 
solutions
• Clear and 
understandable to 
foreigners
• Ergonomics - the way 
we use our devices, even 
wear our devices (MR, 
VR) for gaming or 
productivity
“Zero risk of life threatening effects.”
“Absolute minimisation of livelihood 
and ecosystem threatening effects.”
Transport technology Broad agreement across most questions, however a few 
representatives from Europe in industry disagree across the 
board, and more contradiction around ownership of risk. 
Design for safety is not clearly understood in this sector.
• What kind of analysis 
will lead me to complete 
realistic body of safety 
requirements? 
• Reduce the leading 
cause of preventable 
deaths (traffic accidents)
• Software risk mitigation 
from design solutions to 
operational procedures
• Electronic displays
• Universal or 
standardised systems
• Data overload
• Regulatory frameworks 
for mariners (ie bridge 
design)
• Heat, noise and 
vibration effect on 
human performance
• Multiple alarms
• Less human operators 
on ships means risks can 
be greater
• Complexity over 
simplicity of use of 
lifeboats means they 
might be killing more 
seamen than they are 
saving
• Is technology being 
designed without 
diligent research into its 
actual effect on 
humans?
“Consider the entire life-cycle of the 
system and all its aspects, ie social. , 
technical and interfaces, in order to 
design for safety.”
National infrastructure Broadly agree that design for safety is a major issue  
and clearly communicates a procedure that prevents or 
identifies risk. The sector shows conflict around 
continuous risk assessment across all stages of business 
operation, and that risk assessment combines both 
technology and human behaviour.
• Uncertainty vs risk
• Public policies
“Inclusive design of urban spaces that 
understands any user or machine
accessing streets and how they behave 
and how they interact.”
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Sector Design for safety recognition by sector Main design for safety issues Definitions of design for safety
Medical technology Design for safety is a major issue across the sector  
and disagreement that risks are clearly owned across  
all levels and are a top operational criterion. This 
highlights a major concern and appears realistic in its 
self-assessment.
• Reducing medical error on hospital wards and 
emergency mobile healthcare
• Understanding the role of design in shaping 
behaviours to improve patient safety
• Design to optimise implementation of safer 
interventions
“Design for safety = co-research (define 
safety problems with front line-clinicians 
and patients), co-design (generate and 
iterate concepts) and co-implementation 
(optimise designs for regulatory and 
procurement considerations).”
“Do no harm.”
Manufacturing technology Design for safety is a major issue across the sector and 
general agreement that risks are clearly communicated 
and owned. Does this indicate a gap between 
acknowledging ownership verses acting on risks and  
a deeper understanding of impact is missing?
Three themes: ownership of the hazard, data 
protection and human safety
• Personal data
• Protection and ethics
• Fake information and news
• Technical safety
• Reliability
• Patient safety
“Design for safety is a process for 
incorporating construction safety into the 
design and engineering [of ship building] 
through early identification and 
mitigation of risk by engineering, supply 
chain, project management and 
planning, supported by the operations 
team.”
Food products General agreement with all statements. • Physical infrastructure design for food safety
• Capacity building of industry to ensure safe food
• Building by government to ensure safe food supplies
“The infrastructure (and process) of food 
and how safety can be designed as an 
integral part. An awareness of the risks 
between industries and government to 
create a better legislation.”
Table 1 (continued): Main design for safety sector responses
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Sector Design for safety recognition by sector Main design for safety issues Definitions of design for safety
Medical technology Design for safety is a major issue across the sector  
and disagreement that risks are clearly owned across  
all levels and are a top operational criterion. This 
highlights a major concern and appears realistic in its 
self-assessment.
• Reducing medical error on hospital wards and 
emergency mobile healthcare
• Understanding the role of design in shaping 
behaviours to improve patient safety
• Design to optimise implementation of safer 
interventions
“Design for safety = co-research (define 
safety problems with front line-clinicians 
and patients), co-design (generate and 
iterate concepts) and co-implementation 
(optimise designs for regulatory and 
procurement considerations).”
“Do no harm.”
Manufacturing technology Design for safety is a major issue across the sector and 
general agreement that risks are clearly communicated 
and owned. Does this indicate a gap between 
acknowledging ownership verses acting on risks and  
a deeper understanding of impact is missing?
Three themes: ownership of the hazard, data 
protection and human safety
• Personal data
• Protection and ethics
• Fake information and news
• Technical safety
• Reliability
• Patient safety
“Design for safety is a process for 
incorporating construction safety into the 
design and engineering [of ship building] 
through early identification and 
mitigation of risk by engineering, supply 
chain, project management and 
planning, supported by the operations 
team.”
Food products General agreement with all statements. • Physical infrastructure design for food safety
• Capacity building of industry to ensure safe food
• Building by government to ensure safe food supplies
“The infrastructure (and process) of food 
and how safety can be designed as an 
integral part. An awareness of the risks 
between industries and government to 
create a better legislation.”
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A number of challenges have surfaced during this review, the 
answers to which will help accelerate the opportunities identified.
What is the current state of design for safety practice? 
There are clearly good examples of design for safety practice and 
growing awareness in industry and other sectors in how design 
for safety thinking enhances safety. However it is apparent that 
much work needs to be done to bring together a more coherent 
picture at an international level of who designs for safety and the 
methods they use.
What is missing from design for safety? 
Design for safety is missing a collation of commonly  
applied methods and a clear strategic framework to identify 
which methods are recommended for different situations.  
In support of these methods there is a need for a set of clearly 
articulated principles for the activity of design that builds  
on ethics which can support decision making in complex and 
contradictory scenarios. There is a lack of clarity of who designs 
for safety, who takes up this role, where in the process do  
they engage and to what extent, and crucially who takes 
responsibility for design.
Do we have clear design ethics and principles? 
There is some evidence of broader design ethics and some in 
relation to safety but these are underdeveloped. Operational 
principles for design for safety have yet to be formulated in  
the context of design as framed in this report. 
How should design for safety operate? 
Design for safety should operate in an open collaborative 
relationship between all stakeholders including interest groups. 
‘Designing with’ as opposed to ‘designing for’ should be a central 
principle to ensure that users’ experiences, expertise and insights 
are drawn into the design process. Design for safety should 
operate with authority supported with a clear set of operational 
principles. Design for safety should recognise that creative risk is 
an important asset in developing new solutions and approaches, 
and that this can be encouraged to deliver safer final results. 
Key challenges
A number of 
challenges have 
surfaced during this 
review, the answers  
to which will help 
accelerate the 
opportunities 
identified.
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What is the future of design for safety? 
Design for safety has clearer and more established practices when dealing with more 
traditional products and technologies. For more complex systems, emerging technology  
and behaviour-based applications, there is less clarity. In future we will need to enhance the 
ability to work in interdisciplinary collaborations and engage with design at strategic and 
governmental levels when appropriate. The methods selected and developed need to be 
flexible and adaptable to change and evolving situations. Above all, design for safety needs 
to be an agile and resource-efficient process driven by a set of principles which can provide  
a flexible response to new and emerging challenges.
Is design for safety ready to solve the top future safety issues? 
Design has some tried and tested methods and practices, and has the flexibility and 
ingenuity to develop new ones. Today the application of safe design thinking varies across 
industries and sectors with some having clear approaches whereas in others there appear to 
be operational complexities that prevent design from making a bigger safety contribution. 
The future issues for safe design are how to develop more effective operational methods  
for invisible risks, like data security and artificial intelligence (AI), methods for incorporating 
human behaviour and systemic dynamic complexity and strategic design skills for guiding 
large scale responses to climate change, sustainability and disruptive human actors.
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In this section we bring together the review contents so far and identify what is needed to 
promote safer design. 
Design for safer human behaviour
We need to embed a better understanding of human behaviour, culture and emotional 
states into the design of products, services and systems. 
This review has identified that human behaviour is one of the major challenges for the 
future of safe design. Solving this challenge will involve blending technological skills and 
human behavioural characteristics at the design stage. In order to achieve this we need to 
understand and develop more powerful methods and practices for improving safety through 
design by influencing behaviour change. Part of this relies on designing to improve public 
understanding of personal responsibility and risk.
Design for safety principles and ethics 
We need a clear set of principles and ethics to create a design for safety culture.
A common set of principles and ethics is needed to guide the development and selection of 
design methods. Such principles and ethics will support decisions between the trade-offs of 
cost and impact that are often needed during the design process. 
Opportunities for a better 
design for safety culture 
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Safer design methods
We need an agreed overview of design for safety methods that can be applied to current 
and future design for safety challenges. 
This is a significant issue requiring both knowledge and development of different design 
methods that can address safety challenges. This issue requires multidisciplinary approaches 
and industrial and institutional sharing of best practices. Specifically these methods take into 
account a wider consideration of relationships than design for safety has traditionally taken 
in the past.
Sharing design for safety practices
We need to share best design for safety practices in industrial, institutional and educational 
sectors through global networks.
A collaboration between international and diverse mature and emerging sectors is needed 
to learn and share from each other. This could be of great benefit for identifying emerging 
and future design issues and sharing best practices and new solutions. Design for safety 
methods need to be flexible to cope with the need for constant change to adapt to new  
and emerging future risks caused by complexity, the unexpected and changing scenarios.
Design for safety education and training
We need a design for safety practice built on education and training.
The promotion, adoption and training of design for safety methods by both designers and 
non-designers are currently missing. The training of those with roles that include or overlap 
design will accelerate the wider sharing and adoption of best practices and design principles 
to reduce risk. There is fundamental lack of undergraduate and postgraduate professional 
training in design for safety. This is a major gap in educational provision for training future 
leaders who will design everything from products and services to strategic infrastructure. 
Safety by design for new and emerging industries
We need to learn how to deliver new products and services that are intrinsically safer 
through design. 
At present there is a gap in knowledge for developing design for safety frameworks in new 
and emerging industries. Closely connected to this is the need for resources for improving 
the visualisation and simulation of future risks. The whole lifecycle of products and systems 
often lacks a safety by design mindset that includes construction, repair, refurbishment and 
decommissioning, all of which are increasingly important parts of a sustainable economy.
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Figure 7: Design for safety (DFS) gap and direction of design project journeys
The opportunities described in this section can be described as a gap between the 
development of products, services and infrastructures and the achievement of safer design 
which is illustrated in figure 7. This summary recognises that reliance on laws, codes and 
standards alone is insufficient to create safer designs. In order to create safer designs there is 
a need for a set of design for safety ethics and principles, culture and practices that bridge 
the gap.
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This review has identified the need to develop ethics and 
principles on which a design for safety culture, methods and 
practices can be established. Such ethics and principles require 
common global acceptance and this review aims to start a 
discussion within the wider community to reach this goal. 
Following the review process it has been possible to define some 
preliminary aspirational definitions which it is envisaged will help 
create the foundations for a design for safety culture. 
Definition of design for safety
Aspirational principles for 
design for safety 
This review has 
identified the need  
to develop ethics and 
principles on which  
a design for safety 
culture, methods  
and practices can  
be established.
“We believe design for safety enables people and 
technology to operate safely. Design for safety includes  
the actions taken to ensure that an item, system, system  
of systems or network is free from adverse impacts  
on individuals, organisations, communities and the 
environment, whether these happen as a result of  
implicit or explicit risks.”
 
Overarching principles
• Design for safety is environmentally sustainable.
• Design for safety actively reduces societal risk.
• Design for safety achieves these through the holistic delivery  
of its outputs. 
These proposed design for safety principles are set out in more 
detail overleaf in table 2.
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Is environmentally sustainable
Operational principle Application
Design for safety minimises risk to all human life 
and aims to treat all social, ethnic and geographic 
demographics equally
Act to minimise risk to life in all situations 
and consider all stakeholders equally
Design for safety is ethical in its actions and intents 
and is aware of the scope and consequences of its 
actions
Think for the benefit of all
Design for safety is resource and cost efficient while 
delivering the required functionality
Deliver resource efficiency for long term 
global sustainability of all outputs
Design for safety fully engages with stakeholders 
and the wider environment
Include people and the environment as a 
connected system
Design for safety considers full lifecycle ethics Consider all long-term human and 
environmental impacts
Table 2: Proposed design for safety principles 
Actively reduces societal risk
Operational principle Application
Design for safety has a societally beneficial effect Prevent socially divisive solutions
Design for safety considers risk to people from both 
expected and unexpected outcomes
Reduce planned and unplanned risk for all
Design for safety openly shares good design 
practice
Eliminate repeated risks for all
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May 2018 
Lloyd’s Register Foundation
Report Series: No.2018.2
 Holistic delivery of its outputs
Operational principle Application
Design for safety transcends the traditional 
disciplinary boundaries of design
Multidisciplinary inclusive approach
Design for safety is transparent in all its actions and 
intent
Communicate with clear motives and 
methods
Design for safety is user centred Engage people at the centre of solutions
Design for safety generates and delivers trust and 
respect throughout all its activities
Seek truth, report truth without favour
Design for safety is up to date and relevant in its 
context
Adapt to new and emerging risks
Design for safety has clear and unambiguous goals 
to meet standards and comply with regulation
Comply to standards and regulations
Design for safety has clear and unambiguous 
responsibilities and accountabilities
Ensure clear management structures 
communicate who is responsible for what
Design for safety uses critical analysis to deliver 
definitive answers on exposure to risk
Seek to assess and communicate current 
and emerging exposure to new risks
Design for safety makes clear its capabilities and 
limitations of personal, organisational, technical 
capability and authority
Do not take on more than you are 
competent to do
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This review of design for safety has identified three key gaps 
which need to be bridged in order for society to fully benefit 
from safer design: ethics and principles, safety culture and safety 
practices. Four recommendations are made to bridge these gaps 
that when implemented will lead to safer designs.
Identifying future design for safety 
challenges
There is a need to establish a design for safety research 
observatory that identifies emerging major safety issues and 
investigates whether new design methods are required. A key 
part of this activity will be understanding the most appropriate 
ways of solving or mitigating these emerging new challenges and 
the appropriate methods that should be used. A useful approach 
would be to establish a risk-consequence map applied to an 
example industrial sector showing where new design for safety 
issues are needed and if existing types of design method could  
be applied.
 
Developing future design for safety 
methods and skills
Looking forwards there is a need to establish a capability that:
• has expertise in existing design for safety methods
• researches and develops new design methods to address gaps 
in knowledge
• has an experimental design activity which can compare and test 
design methods against existing and emerging safety threats
• develops graduate and postgraduate educational programmes 
that promote state-of-the-art approaches for safer design
• engages the wider community to learn and share experiences 
and best practice.
 
Recommendations 
Four recommendations 
are made to bridge  
key gaps that when 
implemented will lead 
to safer designs.
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Establish a global network of excellence
To maximise the impact of the previous two recommendations an international network  
of centres of excellence should be established. The global reach of this network will allow 
emerging challenges to be identified and for best practice to be disseminated as widely as 
possible to maximise impact.  
The unique input of the Foundation
There is already international interest in turning the above recommendations into reality. 
Before the centres of excellence can be established there is a need for preliminary activity 
including: 
• engaging a diverse and representative range of international industrial and institutional 
partners
• locating partners from different regions who can bring existing local design for safety 
expertise to a global level
• a set of initial design for safety global challenges to focus activities of the network
• further research on design for safety practices, ethics and principles, case studies and 
methods
• experimental projects testing new design for safety methods on emerging risks
• a long term set of milestones, and 
• principles for collaboration and exchange. 
This would provide the momentum for others to grow and sustain the first two 
recommendations. The Foundation is uniquely placed to support the initial stages that lead 
to the establishment of what will be a programme that benefits society at large.
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The literature review found evidence relating to the remit of the review including the NHS 
Design for Patient Safety report (Buckle, P et al, 2003), which recommends using design 
thinking for risk reduction to increase safety in the NHS environment including patients, 
doctors and nurses. The Office for Rail and Road's Strategy for Regulation of Health and 
Safety Risks report (Office of Rail and Road, 2017) considers applying design thinking for 
health and safety in the rail industry. The Internet Way (Grossman, 2015) provided an 
example of how mature industries can learn from the emerging by looking at the social 
dynamics created by digital networks. In this context Grossman indicates that safety and trust 
are factors to consider when designing interactions that communicate risk. 
In terms of human factors, examples of methods that can be used for behaviour change in 
relation to the culture of risk were found. Explaining Risk Perception (Sjöberg, et al, 2004) 
discusses culture, habits and religion, and the different degrees to which people are exposed 
to and understand risk. The Royal Navy report, A Guide to Understanding Human Factors 
and Human Behaviour (Bridger, et al, 2012) played an important role in framing people’s 
behaviour in relation to the environment, the organisation, work dynamics, design of 
machines, equipment, software and workspace. Proactive behaviour, analysis of behaviour 
and an analysis of cultural behaviours during risks were examined (Marshall, 2016) (Elliot, 
1983) (Health and Safety Executive, 2012) as possible factors that design for safety could take 
in account. A Design Approach for Safety Based on Product-Service Systems and Function-
Behaviour-Structure, describes a model that links human behaviour to the dynamics of the 
work environment required to deliver a service (Sadeghi et al, 2017). The Haddon-Cave 
report (2006) highlighted issues of a lack of safety culture and an over reliance on systems 
instead of vigilant practices. In the context of global risks, recommendations suggest to 
invest in developing new methods to mitigate emerging risks such as cybersecurity (World 
Economic Forum, 2016) which is an area that many sectors are attempting to tackle.  
The report recently released by the UK government on cybersecurity, Secure by Design, 
(Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, 2018) mentions design, however this is 
mainly understood as physical products which protect people from risks like the loss of  
data and cybersecurity. Henk Ovink’s Hurricane Sandy Task Force constitutes an interesting 
example of design as a strategy to creatively engage local communities, stakeholders, experts 
and government to reduce risk (Ovink, Boeijenga, 2018) in the event of extreme weather 
events. 
Across the sources consulted there was a general uniformity of understanding and 
assessment of risk. However if the sources are viewed from a strategic design for safety 
perspective some contradictions emerge. These contradictions concern the different 
application of human factors alongside sector specific solutions and practices. This limits  
Appendix A: Literature 
review
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a cross-sector view of safety and a holistic perspective of risk. Cross-sector discussions can 
help prevent isolated approaches and increase the communication of best practices.
Little evidence was found of attempts to challenge safety procedures and the research 
identified that the practice of safety and human behaviour, communicating risk and personal 
responsibility in particular are key points that future design for safety strategies should take 
into account. However there was evidence of design for human factors and its role in the 
safety cycle; the HSE research (Health and Safety Executive, 2012) explored how safety can 
become an approach to behave safely through education and proactive behaviour and  
A Guide to Understanding Human Factors and Human Behaviour (Bridger, et al, 2012) 
proposes a model that integrates behaviour in the whole lifecycle of a product from design 
to manufacture and use.
The main gaps outlined by the literature review are the human errors and lack of clear 
personal responsibilities relating to managing, supervising, communicating and dealing with 
risk. Even though the latest safety strategies in the maritime, healthcare and transportation 
sectors have taken into account behaviour in the environment, there is a design gap in 
understanding the variable human behaviours in the system and the responsibility of 
handing over risk to other parties.
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